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JURISDICTION
This case is before the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the
Utah Code Annotated and pursuant to the Motion to Dismiss entered as a final judgment by
the trial court. The appeal was referred to the Utah Court of Appeals under Section 78-2a3(2)0')STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court correctly granted the Masoud Shafizadeh's Motion to

Dismiss/Summary Judgment based on the language of the Commercial Lease Agreement
which exculpated Mr. Shafizadeh from any injury or damage to any person and property, and
which required the Bonnemas to indemnify and hold Mr. Shafizadeh harmless for any such
damage or injuries, as well as requiring the Bonnemas to provide insurance coverage for
property damage and fire insurance on the leased premises in the amount of at least SI
million.
2.

Whether the trial court correctly granted Mr. Shafizadeh's motion for

attorneys' fees based on the express provisions of the Commercial Lease Agreement, which
required the non-prevailing party to pay the prevailing party's costs and attorneys for any
legal action concerning the Commercial Lease Agreemeent.
3.

Whether Mr. Shafizadeh is entitled to an award of attorney's fees incurred in

defending the appeal.

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

An appellate court reviews the district court's grant of a motion to dismiss

for correctness, accepting as true the factual allegations of the complaint and drawing all
inferences in the plaintiffs favor. Stokes v. Van Wagoner, 1999 UT 94, ^ 6.
If the Court decides that Mr. Shafizadeh's motion should be considered a motion
for summary judgment, then an appellate court reviews the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for correctness, affording no special deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions. Girbich v. Numed, Inc., 977 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1999). The reviewing court
may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even
if it is one not relied upon below. See Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 (Utah
1993).
2.

Whether attorney fees are recoverable is a question of law, which an

appellate court reviews for correctness. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305, 315 (Utah
1998).
3.

There is no cited standard of review for whether an award of attorney's fees

should be awarded on appeal. However, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted the mle of
law that a provision for payment of attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees
incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at trial, if the action is brought to
enforce the contract. Management Servs. Corp. v. Development Assocs., 617 P.2d 406,
408-409 (Utah 1980).

2

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
None.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This is an action arising out of a fire to a leased premises. (R. 2-3.) The lessees,
Steve and Tori Bonnema, leased portions of a building from Masoud Shafizadeh. (R. 2.)
The parties memorialized their agreement in a document titled "Commercial Lease
Agreement." (R. 8-14. See, Appendix A.) On October 11, 2001, a fire damaged the
premises, and the Bonnemas claimed that they lost personal business property and claim
loss of use damages. (R. 3.)
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

The Bonnemas filed an action against Masoud Shafizadeh on August 22, 2002,
alleging that he negligently "allowed" a fire to occur at the leased premises. (R. 1-45.)
The Bonnemas' Complaint alleged causes of action for 1) Breach of the Commercial
Lease Agreement, 2) Negligence, and 3) Res Ipsa Loquitur. (R. 1-45.)
Mr. Shafizadeh responded with a motion to dismiss, stating that the hold harmless,
indemnification, release and insurance provisions contained in the parties' Commercial
Lease Agreement barred all of the Bonnemas' claims as a matter of la.,. (R. 108-135.)
Oral Argument on the motion was heard by Honorable Robert K. Hilder on February 20,
2003. (R. 315.) Following arguments of counsel, the court ruled that Mr. Shafizadeh's
motion to dismiss was well-taken and granted the motion. (R. 238-241.) Counsel for Mr.
3

Shafizadeh prepared an order on the motion to dismiss which was signed by the court on
April 16, 2003. the order was amended by Judge Robert K. Hilder on July 3, 2002.
(R. 238-241)
On March 21, 2003, Mr. Shafizadeh filed a motion for attorney's fees, (R. 178197), which was granted by the trial court on September 26, 2003. (R 280-282.). The
Court granted Mr. Shafizadeh reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $1,756.98. (R.
286-287, 280-282.)
C.

DISPOSITION OF THE COURT,

The trial court granted Mr. Shafizadeh's motion to dismiss on February 20, 2003.
The also granted a motion for attorney's fees in favor of Mr. Shafizadeh in the amount of
$1,756.98. (R.286-87.)1
A.

Statement of Facts

On February 25, 2000, the Bonnemas and Masoud Shafizadeh entered into a lease
agreement for the rental of certain property located at 8029 South 700 East, Sandy, Utah
84093. (R. 8-14. See, also Commercial Lease Agreement attached in Appendix A.) The
Lease Agreement defines the "Lessee" as "Steve and Tori Bonnema." (R. 8.) Steve and
Tori Bonnema's signatures are found on the bottom Page 6 of the Commercial Lease
Agreement. (R. 13.) The Lease Agreement defined the "Lessor*'as "Masoud
Shafizadeh." (R. 8.)

]

The Bonnemas' representation that the trial court awarded $7,500 in attorneys
fees is incorrect. See, Appellant's Brief at 9.
4

On October 11, 2001, a fire occurred at the leased premises which the Bonnemas
allege destroyed much of their personal business property and allegedly caused business
losses and property damage. (R. 3.) The Commercial Lease Agreement was in effect at
the time of the fire, and was effective from March 1, 2000 until February 28, 2003. (R.
8.) In the allegations contained in their Complaint, the Bonnemas did not allege that Mr.
Shafizadeh caused the fire. (R. 1-45.) Rather, the Bonnemas claimed that Mr.
Shafizadeh "acted negligently by allowing the fire to occur . . ." (R. 3.)
The Lease Agreement contained a provision under which the Bonnemas agreed
that Mr. Shafizadeh would not be held liable for any injury or damage resulting to persons
or property in or about the rented premises:
Lessor shall not be liable to the Lessee for any injury or damage that may
result to any person or property by or from any cause whatsoever in or about
the premises.
(R. 10.)
Paragraph 13 of the Commercial Lease Agreement also required the Bonnemas to
indemnify, hold harmless and defend Mr. Shafizadeh against any claims occurring in or
about the premises as follows:
Lessee shall indemnify, hold harmless and defend Lessor against and from
any and all claims whatsoever occurring in or about the premises from any
cause.
(R. 10.)
The Bonnemas also promised in the Commercial Lease Agreement to maintain
property damage and fire insurance on the leased property with insurance limits of at least
5

$1 million covering the leased premises and personal property for the full replacement
value of such property. (R. 10.) Those contractual promises are provided, as follows:
Lessee shall throughout the term of this Rental Agreement, at its sole cost
and expense, provide and keep in force with responsible insurance
companies satisfactory to Lessor and to any mortgagee under a mortgage or
deed of trust constituting a lien upon the demised premises, public liability
and property damage insurance.
The liability limits of all said insurance shall be in the aggregate limits of at
least one million ($1,000,000.00) dollars for any accident resulting in bodily
injury to or the death of one or more persons, and consequential damages
arising therefrom and liability or damage to all the property in the leased
premises as well as liability to any employees or servants of Lessee or to
any other person whomsoever arising out of or in connection with the
Lessee's use of the rented premises or the condition of the rented premises.
Fire and extended coverage insurance, including Vandalism and Malicious
mischief endorsements, covering all trade fixtures, furniture, furnishings
and equipment located on the leased premises, providing protection to the
insurable value thereof, but no more than one hundred (100%) percent of
the replacement value thereof.
Said policies of insurance shall name Lessor and the holder of such
encumbrances with a certificate of insurance, executed by the insurer
involved, which shall contain, in addition to the matters customarily set
forth in such a certificate under standard insurance company practice an
understanding by the insurer to give the Lessor and the holder of such
encumbrances ten (10) days prior written notice of any cancellation, change
in scope or modification of coverage of such policies. Lessee is to furnish
Lessor with a Certificate of Liability Insurance within 30 days after
commencement of this Agreement.
(R. 10.)
Following the fire, it came to light that the Bonnemas did not purchase the correct
type of insurance and the insurance obtained by the Bonnemas did not cover some of the
damages resulting from the fire. (R. 148, 315, p. 2-8) In violation of the provisions of
6

the Commercial Lease Agreement, on August 22,2002, the Bonnemas instituted an action
against Mr. Shafizadeh alleging that he negligently allowed a fire to occur at the leased
premises. (R. 1-45.) The Bonnemas' Complaint alleged causes of action for 1) Breach of
the Commercial Lease Agreement, 2) Negligence, and 3) Res Ipsa Loquitur. (R. 1-45.)
Mr. Shafizadeh filed a motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs claims on or about
September 4, 2002. (R. 108-135.) The matter was fully briefed by the parties and a
hearing was held before Judge Robert K. Hilder on February 20, 2003, in which the Court
heard oral arguments from both the Bonnemas' counsel and Mr. Shafizadeh's counsel.
(R. 315.) Following arguments of counsel, the Court ruled that Mr. Shafizadeh5s motion
to dismiss was well-taken and granted the motion to dismiss on the grounds that:
a.

The Court finds as a matter of law that the Commercial Lease Agreement,
in Section 13 of the Agreement, entered into between Plaintiffs and Mr.
Shafizadeh contained a valid, clear and unambiguous indemnification
agreement under which Plaintiffs contracted that Defendant would not be
liable to Plaintiffs for any injury or damage resulting to any person or
property from any cause on the leased premises, and, that the Plaintiffs
contracted to indemnify, hold harmless and defend Mr. Shafizadeh from
any and all claims whatsoever occurring in or about the premises from any
cause.

b.

The Court finds that even if the indemnification language is deemed
insufficient the Commercial Lease Agreement, in Section 13 of the
Agreement, contained a valid, clear and unequivocal agreement requiring
Plaintiffs to purchase insurance coverage to cover Plaintiffs and Mr.
Shafizadeh for all damages resulting from the fire which allegedly caused
the Plaintiffs' damages, which fire is the subject of this action. The Court
further found that Plaintiffs breached their contractual agreement to
purchase insurance which would have covered all of their alleged damages.
Because the Plaintiffs' breached the agreement to purchase insurance, they
stepped into the position of the insured, and could not properly maintain any
claim against Mr. Shafizadeh. The Plaintiffs' breach of the Commercial
7

Lease Agreement barred any claim that Plaintiffs could otherwise maintain
against Mr. Shafizadeh.
(R. 238-241.f
Paragraph 22 of the Commercial Lease Agreement contained a provision for
attorneys fees which states as follows:
If Lessor or Lessee shall bring any action for any relief against any
other arising out of this Agreement, or to recover possession of said
property, whether such action progresses to judgment or not, the losing
party shall pay to the successful party, in addition to other relief
granted, its costs and expenses including reasonable attorney's fees.
(R. 12. Emphasis added.)
Mr. Shafizadeh was adjudged to be the successful party and therefore, the district
court awarded Mr. Shafizadeh $1,756.98 in attorney's fees incurred in defending the
Bonnemas' action. (R. 287.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Commercial Lease Agreement signed by the Bonnemas contains various
contractual provisions which bar all of the Bonnemas5 claims against Mr. Shafizadeh.
The contract contains release, indemnification, hold harmless, and defense language
prohibiting any claims by the Bonnemas. Each of those provisions is clear, unambiguous
and unequivocal. These provisions alone would be sufficient to bar the Bonnemas claims
against Mr. Shafizadeh, and ther trial court so ruled.

2

The emphasized language contained in Paragraph 2 of the Order Granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was handwritten in by Judge Robert Hilder on July 3,
2002.
8

In addition, the Commercial Lease Agreement also contains a provision requiring
the Bonnemas to purchase insurance, to cover themselves and Mr. Shafizadeh, in an
amount sufficient to cover the entire premises and all of the Bonnemas' personal property
within the building. The contract expressly required the Bonnemas to purchase insurance
to guard against the risk of fire. However, the Bonnemas admitted that they failed to
procure the required insurance. This was a material breach by the Bonnemas of the
Commercial Lease Agreement, and required them to step into the position of the insurer
and accept the risk of loss themselves. The Bonnemas' failure to procure the required
insurance also operated to bar any claims they might have against Mr. Shafizadeh.
The Bonnemas' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and their request for a
new trial, (which they attempt to intertwine with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur), are not
properly before the Court, as they are not appealable issues on which the trial court made
a final ruling. Moreover, the issues do not mandate a reversal of the trial court's ruling
because the parties chose their remedies, and contemplated that the Bonnemas would bear
the risk of any damage to the property through the clear and unequivocal indemnification
and insurance provisions of the Commercial Lease Agreement.
Mr. Shafizadeh was correctly awarded a reasonable amount of attorney's fees
under the express terms of the Commercial Lease Agreement, as he was the prevailing
party in an action based on the contract. Under Utah law, Mr. Shafizadeh is entitled to all
of his attorney's fees incurred in defending this appeal, and requests that the Court
remand the case to the trial court solely for a finding of an additional reasonable amount
9

of attorney's fees incurred by Mr. Shafizadeh in connection with this appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE
DEFENSE, INDEMNIFICATION AND HOLD HARMLESS
PROVISIONS IN THE COMMERCIAL LEASE AGREEMENT AS A
MATTER OF LAW AND DISMISSED THE BONNEMAS5 CLAIMS
AGAINST MR. SHAFIZADEH.
The district court correctly ruled that the Commercial Lease Agreement entered
into by the Bonnemas and Mr. Shafizadeh precluded the Bonnemas' claims as a matter of
law. The resolution of the motion to dismiss involved the district court's interpretation
and application of the plain and unambiguous language of the Commercial Lease
Agreement to the facts, as alleged by the Bonnemas' Complaint. The issues raised by Mr.
Shafizadeh in his Motion to Dismiss were questions of law, and the trial court correctly
addressed and correctly ruled upon those issues. The core issue before the trial court was
whether the hold harmless, indemnification, and insurance provisions contained in the
Commercial Lease Agreement barred all of the Bonnemas' claims against Mr.
Shafizadeh. The district court correctly answered those questions in the affirmative and
dismissed the action.
In rendering its decision and judgment, the district court properly applied Utah
law, which recognizes that contracting parties may validly bargain to limit their liability

10

under contract.3 See, Zollman v. Meyers. 797 F.Supp. 923 (D. Utah 1992)(applying Utah
law). Specifically, Zollman recognized that ". . . it is not the public policy of the State of
Utah to prohibit a business . . . from seeking to limit its liability." Id., 797 F.Supp. at 927.
In fact, Utah's appellate courts have held that such limit of liability agreements are
enforceable when the broad sweep of the language employed in the agreement clearly
covers those instances in which a party may be negligent. Russ v. Woodside Homes,
Inc.. 905 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1995).
In this case, there is no evidence that Mr. Shafizadeh caused the fire, and the
Bonnemas did not allege that Mr. Shafizadeh caused the fire in their Complaint. At best,
the Bonnemas alleged that Mr. Shafizadeh "allowed" the fire to occur. However, even
assuming that Mr. Shafizadeh negligently caused the fire, the language of the Commercial
Lease Agreement operates to bar their claims against Mr. Shafizadeh as a matter of law.
The Bonnemas and Mr. Shafizadeh entered into the Commercial Lease Agreement in an
arms length transaction between two business owners. Under the defense,
indemnification, hold harmless, and the insurance provisions contained in the contract,
the Bonnemas' claims fail as a matter of law.
In order to evaluate the standards under which indemnification provisions of a

3

The Utah Supreme Court in Hawkins v. Peart. 2001 UT 94,U 9, stated that most
courts allow release of liability for prospective negligence, except where there is a strong
public interest in the services provided.
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contract should be held to be enforceable, a more detailed review of Russ v. Woodside.
905 P.2d 901, 905 (Utah App. 1995), is appropriate. In Russ, this Court described three
general circumstances in which parties may obtain contractual releases from liability for
negligent acts: (1) where injuries have already occurred and one party releases the other
from liability for those injuries,
(2) where one party agrees to indemnify for liability for future injuries, and (3) where one
party agrees to release the other from liability for future injuries. See Russ, 905 P.2d at
904- 05. The second and third categories require a clear and unequivocal expression of
the intent to indemnify or release according to Russ. See id. However, this Court made it
clear that mit is not necessary that the exculpatory language refers expressly to the
negligence of the indemnitee, so long as the intention to indemnify can be 'clearly
implied from the language and purposes of the entire agreement.'" Id at 905 (quoting
Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 370 (Utah 1990).
Thus, the clear rule from Russ is that when the intent to indemnify and release
another party is clearly and unequivocally expressed in a contract, Utah courts will
enforce those provisions. In Russ, the Court of Appeals found that the release entered
into by the parties, which stated that Woodside would be held harmless for "any and all
claims, damages, loss and expenses," and which provided that Woodside would be held
harmless w'to the fullest extent permitted by law . . . for any death, accident, injury, or
other occurrence," clearly and unequivocally established the parties' intent to avoid
Woodside's potential liability. Therefore, the Court held that any negligence claim
12

against Woodside was barred as a matter of law.
In the present case, the language of the Commercial Lease Agreement conforms to
the standard for indemnification agreements set out in Russ. The district court expressly
found a clear and unequivocal expression of intent on the part of the Bonnemas to
indemnify and hold Mr. Shafizadeh harmless from the claims that they raised in their
Complaint. In the hearing held on February 20, 2003, Judge Hilder stated his findings
with respect to the sufficiency of the indemnification and hold harmless language
contained in the Commercial Lease Agreement, as follows:
I think the problem is you didn't have a sufficient [insurance] policy but
that's not the landlord's fault. I do understand your argument but I also
think there's a place for motions to dismiss and there's a place for motion
for summary judgment and I believe the language here, the indemnity
language, is probably sufficient under the case law as it has evolved
over the last 20 years since Union Pacific to shift the responsibility.
(R. 315, p. 17 of Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss. Emphasis added.)
More importantly, the Commercial Lease Agreement on its face conveys a clear
expression of the intent on the part of the Bonnemas to release, hold harmless and
indemnify Mr. Shafizadeh, and thus avoid his liability. Specifically, the Commercial
Lease Agreement provides, with respect to releasing Mr. Shafizadeh from any injury or
damages, as follows:
Lessor shall not be liable to the Lessee for any injury or damage that may
result to any person or property by or from any cause whatsoever in or about
the premises.
(R. 10.) Paragraph 13 of the Commercial Lease Agreement also required the Bonnemas

13

"any and all" damages, liabilities and injuries.
The federal district court determined that the FAA was not sufficiently clear and
unequivocal to require Jones to indemnify UP&L against plaintiffs claims.6 However,
the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the decision on certification and reached a different
result. The supreme court began its analysis by stating that a party is contractually
obligated to assume ultimate financial responsibility for the negligence of another only
when that intention was "clearly and unequivocally expressed." id., 793 P.2d at 370. The
court recognized the growing trend to relax some of the strict rules of construction in such
agreements, and evaluated the identification agreement at issue "according to the
objectives of the parties and the surrounding facts and circumstances" in order to
determine the enforceability of the agreement. IcL The FFA plainly showed that Jones
contracted to indemnify UP&L from "any and all liability" arising from the attachment of
cable equipment to utility poles. Specifically, the agreement stated as follows:
Licensee [Jones] shall indemnify, protect, and save harmless Licensor
[UP&L] from and against any and all claims, demands, causes of action,
costs or other liabilities for damages to property and injury or death to
persons which may arise out of or be connected with the erection,
maintenance, presence, use or removal of Licensee's equipment, or of
structures, guys and anchors, used, installed or placed for the principal
purpose of supporting Licensee's equipment or by any act of Licensee on or
in the vicinity of Licensor's poles, including, but not by way of limitation,
payments made under workmen's compensation laws.

6

Freund was certified from the Tenth Circuit Court to the Utah Supreme Court
under Rule 41 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to address several unresolved
questions of Utah law.
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Id., at 371 (emphasis in original). The supreme court noted that the clause did not
expressly mention the effect of any negligence of UP&L. However, the court ruled that
the broad sweep of the language employed in the agreement clearly covered cases in
which UP&L might be negligent, as the agreement covered "any and all claims, demands,
causes of action, costs or other liabilities." Therefore, the court concluded that the clause
expressed a clear and unequivocal intent of the parties that Jones indemnify UP&L from
any and all liabilities, including liabilities arising from UP&L's negligence.
More recently, in Bishop v. GenTec, Inc., 2002 UT 26, f 19, the Utah Supreme
Court has reemphasized the rules controlling indemnification agreements. Therein, the
court stated as follows:
In the context of negligence, we have consistently held that an "indemnity
agreement which purports to make a party respond for the negligence of
another should be strictly construed." Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co..
793 P.2d 362, 370 (1990). In construing such agreements, we have looked
at the "objectives of the parties and the surrounding facts and
circumstances" in interpreting the contractual language. Id. "In general, the
common law disfavors agreements that indemnify parties against their own
negligence because 'one might be careless of another's life and limb, if there
is no penalty for carelessness.'" Hawkins v. Peart, 2001 UT 94, f 14 (citing
Hvde v. Chevron U.S.A., 697 F.2d 614, 632 (5th Cir. 1983)). Parties
seeking to exempt themselves from tort liability must "'clearly and
unequivocally' express an intent to limit tort liability" within the contract.
See Interwest 923 P.2d at 1356 (quoting DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.. 663
P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1983)). "Without such an expression of intent, 'the
presumption is against any such intention, and it is not achieved by
inference or implication from general language . . . .'" Id (citation omitted).
Id at f 19.
Under the Utah Supreme Court's instruction and reasoning in Freund and Bishop,
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which appear to express the current state of Utah law, the Commercial Lease Agreement
entered into by the Bonnemas and Mr. Shafizadeh is sufficiently clear and unequivocal to
bar the Bonnemas' claims. The Bonnemas agreed that "Lessor [Mr. Shafizadeh] shall not
be liable to the Lessee for any injury or damage... from any claims whatsoever . . . from
any cause." (R. 10.) The parties' intent is clear and unequivocal in releasing Mr.
Shafizadeh from all liability from any claim brought by the Bonnemas. Therefore, the
Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court holding that the Bonnemas' claims failed
as a matter of law.
POINT H
MR. SHAFIZADEH IS ENTITLED TO A RELEASE OF ALL OF
THE BONNEMAS' CLAIMS AS WELL AS COMPLETE
INDEMNIFICATION UNDER THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE
COMMERCIAL LEASE AGREEMENT.
Although the Bonnemas' position expressed in Point II of their Appellate Brief
seems to be that, under Utah law, the concept of complete indemnification does not exist,
that position is erroneous. The Bonnemas' other argument that a contractual
indemnification provision does not bar a tort claim is also without support. The
Bonnemas reliance on DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983), is
misplaced. Apparently, the Bonnemas interpret that case as meaning that tort claims
cannot be barred through a contractual provision. (Brief of Appellant at 13.)
The Bonnemas attempt to construe the holding of DCR too broadly. In DCR, the
contract provision at issue was not the type of hold hamiless or indemnification provision
19

at issue in this case, but rather, was a liquidated damages clause, which contained no
expression of an intent of the parties to limit the defendant's prospective liability in tort.
The contractual clause at issue in DCR referred only to liability under the contract, and
not to extra-contractual liability.
However, DCR cannot be read to impose a ban on limiting or abrogating tort
liability through a contractual indemnity or exculpatory provision. As stated above,
Utah's law is such that courts must review the totality of the contract language and
determine whether the clear intent of the parties is to limit liability, both under tort and
under contract. If the language employed by the contract is clearly expressed and is
unequivocal, tort and contract liability may clearly and properly be limited through a clear
contract provision under Utah law.
The Bonnemas also assert in Point III of their Brief that, in Utah, a party cannot
contract away its own negligence. That position is incorrect. The Utah Supreme Court
has made it clear that, although indemnification agreements are not favorites of the law,
Shell Oil Co. v. Brinkerhoff-Signal Drilling Co.. 658 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1983), the
majority rule is that where the intention to indemnify a person from losses attributable to
his own negligence is "clearly and unequivocally expressed" in the contract language, an
indemnity agreement will be upheld. Id (citing Howe Rents Corp. v. Worthen. 420 P.2d
at 849 (Utah 1966); Union Pacific Railroad v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., at 913-14;
Bamis v. Wilkinson, 398 P.2d 207 (Utah 1965)). See also United States v. Seckinger.
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397 U.S. 203, 211, 25 L. Ed. 2d 224, 90 S. Ct. 880 (1970).
As shown in Russ, an expression of intent to contact away one's own negligence
does not require that the exculpatory language refer expressly to the negligence of the
indemnitee, so long as the intention to indemnify can be "clearly implied from the
language and purposes of the entire agreement." Id. at 905. Reading the release, hold
harmless and indemnification provisions contained in the Commercial Lease Agreement
in harmony with the provision requiring the Bonnemas to name Mr. Shafizadeh as an
insured under an insurance policy, there is a clear intent to relieve Mr. Shafizadeh of any
damages to the Bonnemas' property, even if the damages were occasioned by his own
negligence or due to the condition of the property. Because the contract language is
sufficiently clear in this case, the trial court correctly granted Mr. Shafizadeh's motion to
dismiss, and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
POINT III
THE BONNEMAS BREACHED THE PROVISIONS OF THE
COMMERCIAL LEASE AGREEMENT REQUIRING THEM TO
OBTAIN INSURANCE THAT WOULD COVER ALL OF THEIR
DAMAGES.
a.

The Commercial Lease Agreement required the Bonnemas to
procure insurance which would have covered all of their losses in
this action, and the Bonnemas' failure to procure proper
insurance requires them to step into the shoes of the insurer, and
prohibits their claims against Mr. Shafizadeh.

This Court has ruled that a landlord may, by contract, require a tenant to provide
insurance to protect the leased property. GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P,2d 1157,
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1164 (Utah App. 1994)("the landlord may simply by contract require the tenant to provide
insurance.") The Commercial Lease Agreement required that the Bonnemas procure
insurance to cover any damages to the premises and their own property, even if it was
caused by a fire or by the condition of the property. The contract also required the
Bonnemas to name Mr. Shafizadeh on the policy. The Bonnemas' admitted failure to
procure proper insurance against damage by fire constitutes a material breach of the
Commercial Lease Agreement.
It is undisputed that the Commercial Lease Agreement required the Bonnemas to
purchase property and fire insurance on the leased premises with liability limits of
$1,000,000. (R. 10.) Such insurance was required to cover the building and personal
property of the Bonnemas as follows:
Lessee shall throughout the term of this Rental Agreement, at its sole cost
and expense, provide and keep in force with responsible insurance
companies satisfactory to Lessor and to any mortgagee under a mortgage or
deed of trust constituting a lien upon the demised premises, public liability
and property damage insurance.
The liability limits of all said insurance shall be in the aggregate limits of at
least one million ($1,000,000.00) dollars for any accident resulting in bodily
injury to or the death of one or more persons, and consequential damages
arising therefrom and liability or damage to all the property in the leased
premises as well as liability to any employees or servants of Lessee or to
any other person whomsoever arising out of or in connection with the
Lessee's use of the rented premises or the condition of the rented premises.
Fire and extended coverage insurance, including Vandalism and Malicious
mischief endorsements, covering all trade fixtures, furniture, furnishings
and equipment located on the leased premises, providing protection to the
insurable value thereof, but no more than one hundred (100%) percent of
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the replacement value thereof.
Said policies of insurance shall name Lessor and the holder of such
encumbrances with a certificate of insurance, executed by the insurer
involved, which shall contain, in addition to the matters customarily set
forth in such a certificate under standard insurance company practice an
understanding by the insurer to give the Lessor and the holder of such
encumbrances ten (10) days prior written notice of any cancellation, change
in scope or modification of coverage of such policies. Lessee is to furnish
Lessor with a Certificate of Liability Insurance within 30 days aftercommencement of this Agreement.
(R. 10.)
The Bonnema' contractual agreement to provide insurance to cover themselves
and Mr. Shafizadeh against all losses caused by fire should be interpreted under normal
rules of construction and not under a strict or heightened rule of construction. Freund v.
Utah Power & Light Co.. 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990). The Utah Supreme Court has
addressed rules of interpreting contract provisions that require one party to purchase
insurance for the benefit of another, stating that when:
the parties have chosen by clear and unequivocal language to require one
party to indemnify the other from liability arising from any cause including
the indemnitee's own negligence, a further provision in that agreement to
fund that indemnification by purchasing insurance should be construed as
any other contractual language.
Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362 (Utah 1990). This Court has also ruled
that heightened construction is not warranted when interpreting agreements to purchase
insurance for the benefit of another. See Pickhover v. Smith's Management Corp.. 771
P.2d at 667-68 (Utah App. 1989)(and cases cited therein.)
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Despite the clear contractual language requiring the Bonnemas' duty to procure
and maintain insurance on the premises to insure against damages caused by fire, and
other hazards, they failed to procure and maintain such insurance.
This Court has provided instruction regarding the effect of a party's failure to
purchase insurance coverage for the benefit of another in Pickhoverv. Smith's
Management Corp., 771 P.2d 664 (Utah App. 1989). In that case, Yesco, a sign
manufacturer purchased the assets of a competitor, Marvon. In the written purchase
agreement, Yesco agreed to provide insurance coverage sufficient to protect Marvon
against property damage, personal injury or death arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, use, service, transportation or installation of signs up to the amount of one
million dollars. Yesco failed to purchase the insurance.
In 1985, Pickhover was killed when a sign at Smith's Food King fell and struck
him. Pickhover's widow brought a wrongful death action against Yesco, Marvon, and
other defendants. Marvon cross-claimed and moved for summary judgment against
Yesco asserting that the purchase agreement required Yesco to purchase insurance for
Marvon, and that Yesco was liable for any judgment against Marvon up to one million
dollars. The trial court granted Marvon's motion for summary judgment and Yesco
appealed.
The issue on appeal was whether Yesco was required to purchase insurance for
Marvon that would cover Marvon's own negligence. Yesco argued that agreements to
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purchase insurance were akin to indemnity agreements and should, therefore, be governed
by rules of strict construction. Yesco further argued that when so construed, the
agreement did not require Yesco to purchase insurance for Marvon because it did not
expressly require Yesco to purchase insurance to cover Marvon's negligence. The Court
of Appeals rejected Yesco's arguments and stated that agreements to provide insurance
merely allocated an economic burden on one party to make payments to protect another
after the parties decided to shift the risk of loss to an insurer. The court also stated that
insurance of the type that was to be purchased by Yesco was commonly purchased to
protect the named insured from his own negligence. Therefore, summary judgment for
Marvon was affirmed.
In a another recent case, that is analogous to the case before the Court, the
Tennessee Supreme Court held that a lessee's failure to purchase insurance to protect the
leased premises barred its claims against the lessor. Planters Gin Co. v. Federal
Compress & Warehouse Co.. Inc., 78 S.W.3d 885 (Tenn. 2002). Therein, defendant, a
warehouser lessor, was sued by the lessee after a severe storm caused the leased
building's roof to collapse which caused a water pipe to burst and flood the leased
premises. The lease between the parties contained an indemnity clause and required the
plaintiff lessee to insure the property warehoused in the leased premises. After suit was
filed, the defendant moved for, and was granted, summary judgment on the ground that
the lease agreement prevented recovery by the plaintiff against the defendant. The court
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of appeals reversed the judgment, and the parties appealed to the supreme court.
The court reviewed the lease agreement between the parties which provided as
follows:
Lessee agrees to hold harmless and indemnify Lessor from and against any
liability or loss, including counsel fees incurred in good faith by the Lessor,
arising out of any cause associated with Lessee's business or use of the
premises. In addition, Lessee agrees to provide public liability insurance
naming Lessor as additional insured to protect Lessor from risks
customarily covered by such insurance, in amounts not less than $250,000
per person and $500,000 per accident, and $100,000 for damage to
property. Lessee also shall carry contents coverage on its contents with a
waiver of subrogation clause as to Lessor.
Id. 78 S.W.3d 885.
Analyzing the above language employed by the parties, the Tennessee Supreme
Court found no ambiguity and held that the plaintiff agreed to hold the lessor harmless for
any liability or loss. Moreover, the court held that "the meaning of the provision is
inescapable, particularity given the language by which [plaintiff] agrees to provide
insurance to cover the contents stored in the warehouse...." Id. The court concluded that
nothing in the contract limited the allocation of risk and reaffirmed summary judgment
for the lessor.
It is widely held that a party who agrees to procure the insurance and fails to do so
assumes the position of the insurer and, thus, the risk of loss. 16A J. Appleman, Insurance
Law & Practice § 8840 (1981); see also, Walker v. Vanderpool 302 S.E.2d 669 (Va.
1983)(holding that where a plaintiff has contracted to protect the defendant from a loss by
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procuring insurance, the plaintiff or his subrogee may not recover for that loss from the
defendant even if the loss is caused by the defendant's negligence); see also Tidewater
Equipment Co. v. Reliance Insurance Co.. 650 F.2d 503, 506 (4th Cir. 1981); Smith v.
Ryan, 142 So.2d 139, 141 (Fla.App. 1962); Connor v. Thompson Construction &
Development Co.. 166 N.W.2d 109, 112 (Iowa 1969); Midwest Lumber Co. v. Dwight E.
Nelson Construction Co.. 196 N.W.2d377 (Neb. 1972). Temple Eastex, Inc. v. Old
Orchard Creek Partners. Ltd.. 848 S.W.2d 724 (Tx. App. 1992).
In this case, the Bonnemas agreed to purchase insurance to cover the premises as
well as their own personal property, and yet breached their promise to purchase such
insurance. The Bonnemas therefore, assumed the position of the insurer, and accepted the
risk of loss through causes including fire damage. Because the Bonnemas agreed to
procure insurance to cover the property, and to cover any personal property, their claims
against Mr. Shafizadeh are barred as a matter of law.
Moreover, in GNS Partnership this Court held that landlords and tenants are coinsureds for subrogation purposes in the context of insuring the landlord's building. See
id. at 1160-61. Because the Bonnemas and Mr. Shafizadeh are co-insureds, and the
Bonnemas have, de facto, assumed the position of as the insurer on the property, they
cannot bring a subrogation claim against Mr. Shafizadeh, as an insured. Therefore, the
trial court correctly granted Mr. Shatlzadeh's motion to dismiss, and that judgment should
be affirmed on appeal.
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b.

Even assuming that Mr, Shafizadeh breached the Commercial Lease
Agreement, as alleged by the Bonnemas, the parties contractually
agreed that the Bonnemas would bear the risk of providing insurance
to remedy the breach.

The Bonnemas alleged that Mr. Shafizadeh breached the Commercial Lease
Agreement by not keeping the premises in a safe and clean condition. (Appellant's Brief
at 10.) Assuming, arguendo, that allegation is correct, the trial court was correct in
dismissing the Bonnemas' claims, because the parties had, from the moment the
Commercial Lease Agreement was signed, agreed that the Bonnemas would bear the risk
of such a breach. More precisely, the parties agreed that the Bonnemas would bear the
burden of procuring and paying for insurance to cover the entire premises against various
risks including fire and from the condition of the leased premises. (R. 10). Therefore, the
trial court was correct in dismissing the Bonnemas' claim based on the language of the
Commercial Lease Agreement.
The undisputed facts show that the Bonnemas failed to procure the insurance as
required by the Commercial Lease Agreement, and their alleged losses, which otherwise
would have been covered by the insurance they were required to purchase, even if the
losses were caused by the negligent breach of the lease agreement Mr. Shafizadeh, are
not compensable by the Defendant. Therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that the
provisions of the Commercial Lease Agreement relating to the Bonnemas' obligation to
purchase insurance operated to bar their claims against Mr. Shafizadeh as a matter of law.
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The Bonnemas have failed to show, on appeal, that the Court's ruling was erroneous, and
therefore, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ISSUED NO RULING, JUDGMENT OR
OPINION REGARDING THE ALLEGED INEFFECTIVENESS OF
THE BONNEMAS5 COUNSEL, AND THAT ISSUE IS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS.
The Bonnemas have raised several claims regarding the effectiveness of their
counsel. However, the trial court issued no final ruling regarding the effectiveness or
ineffectiveness of the Bonnemas' counsel, and the issue is not properly before the Court
on appeal. Because there is no final ruling from the trial court on that issue, it is not
properly before the Court. It is true that under Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, that an appellate court may remand a criminal case for entry of a finding of
fact regarding ineffectiveness of counsel, but nothing in that rule allows a similar remand
of a civil case. Therefore, there is no appealable issue regarding effectiveness of counsel
before this Court.
It appears that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is an issue that might
have been raised by the Bonnemas in a post-judgment motion under either Rules 59 or 60
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, the Bonnemas raised the issue for the
first time on appeal. Because that issue was raised for the first time on appeal, it is not
properly before the Court, and the Court should decline to address the issue.
However, if the Court decides to address the issue, it should be examined under the
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proper standard, which the Bonnemas' have failed to meet. To show ineffective
assistance of counsel, "a [represented party] must show (1) that counsel's performance
was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but
for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of
the trial would have been different." State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 1995); see
also State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984).
The Bonnemas mischaracterize Judge Hilder's comments with regard to the
effectiveness of their counsel. Judge Hilder made no comment regarding the competency
of the Bonnemas' counsel, nor did he criticize the oral argument presented by the
Bonnemas' counsel. Morever, the Bonnemas mis-cite the record when they allege that
Judge Hilder indicated that they should appeal based on the ineffective assistance of
counsel. Additionally, the Bonnemas' counsel did not fail to appear at a hearing regarding
Mr. Shafizadeh's motion for attorney's fees, because no such hearing was held. The issue
was decided by the trial court without hearing.
In short, all of the Bonnemas arguments regarding ineffective assistance of counsel
fail to satisfy the criteria set out in the Smith and Templin cases. The trial court ruled on
the issues presented to it, as a matter of law, after thorough briefing by both sides, and
after adequate oral arguments of both counsel. Therefore, this Court should affirm the
ruling of the trial court.
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POINT V
THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR IN GRANTING MR.
SHAFIZADEH'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
As a preliminary matter, this is a civil case, governed by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure (and Appellate Procedure), and the Bonnemas' reference to Rule 30 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure had no applicability to this case. Additionally, the
Bonnemas incorrectly cite Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (Appellant's
Brief at 18.) Therefore, the Court should disregard those inapplicable and/or non-existent
rules in rendering its decision on appeal.
The Bonnemas assail the ruling of the trial court on the ground that it allegedly did
not hear all of the evidence against Mr. Shafizadeh. However, the matter was fully
briefed, and the district court did hear and consider all of the evidence necessary to make
a ruling regarding the Commercial Lease Agreement. The trial court's decision was
based on the necessary evidence, including the Commercial Lease Agreement, which the
court had obviously carefully considered in making its decision. Furthermore, the
Bonnemas, through counsel, were given an adequate opportunity to present all of their
arguments in oral and written form to the court before a ruling was made. The Bonnemas
have failed to present any additional or further evidence on appeal which would result in
a different ruling on the Commercial Lease Agreement. Therefore, they have failed to
show that the trial court erred in making its ruling, and the decision of the trial court
should be affirmed.
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POINT VI
THE BONNEMAS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO A NEW TRIAL ON
ANY ISSUE.
The Bonnemas' demand for a new trial misses the point of the trial court's ruling,
and does not appear to be grounded in Utah law. The trial court carefully considered the
covenants made by the contracting parties in the Commercial Lease Agreement, and
implicitly ruled as a matter of law, that even if Mr. Shafizadeh was negligent, or even if
he breached the contract, the parties had previously agreed that the Bonnemas would bear
the risk of those breaches.
As shown above, the language of the Commercial Lease Agreement, and not an
evidentiary rule, including res ipsa loquitur J controls in this case. Therefore, even if the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied in this case, the contractual promises by the
Bonnemas to defend, indemnify, hold harmless, and provide insurance have been chosen
by the parties as the remedies for any damage or injury to the premises resulting from any
cause. The Bonnemas have not shown any right or authority which would allow the
Court to grant them a "new trial" and therefore, the decision of the trial court should be
affirmed.

"Res ipsa loquitur is essentially an evidentiary rule that allows an inference of
negligence to be drawn when human experience provides a reasonable basis for
concluding that an injury probably would not have happened if due care had been
exercised." Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719, 721 (Utah 1985).
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POINT VII
MR, SHAFIZADEH IS ENTITLED TO A FURTHER AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS IN DEFENDING AGAINST THIS
APPEAL.
Utah law is well-settled that a party who is entitled to an award of attorney's fees
may recover an additional reasonable amount of fees incurred in successfully defending
an appeal. See, Centurian Corp. v. Cripps. 624 P.2d 706, 713 (Utah 1981) (granting
prevailing party's request for attorney fees pursuant to contractual agreement and
remanding for determination of amount). The majority of jurisdictions have recognized
that the contractual obligation to pay attorney's fees incurred in enforcing a contract
should include those incurred on appeal. Management Servs. Corp. v. Development
Assocs.. 617 P.2d 406, 408-409 (Utah 1980). This is also the accepted rule in Utah. See,

vL
The Commercial Lease Agreement contains, in Paragraph 22, a provision for
attorney's fees which states as follows:
If Lessor or Lessee shall bring any action for any relief against any other
arising out of this Agreement, or to recover possession of said property,
whether such action progresses to judgment or not, the losing party shall
pay to the successful party, in addition to other relief granted, its costs and
expenses including reasonable attorney's fees.
(R. 12.) It was based on the above language in the parties' contract that the district court
correctly awarded Mr. Shafizadeh reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $1,756.98.
(R. 286-87.) If this Court sees fit to affirm the judgment of the trial court, Mr. Shafizadeh
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requests that the Court remand the case to the district court solely for a determination of
the reasonable amount of attorney's fees incurred by Mr. Shafizadeh on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court was correct in dismissing the Bonnemas' claims against Mr.
Shafizadeh and in granting his attorney's fees. Well-established Utah law supports Mr.
Shafizadeh's position that the language of the Commercial Lease Agreement is clear and
unambiguous in showing that the intent of the parties to require the Bonnemas to defend,
indemnify and hold harmless Mr. Shaifzadeh against any and all claims whatsoever
occurring from any cause. Those contractual provisions coupled with the Bonnemas'
contractual promises to provide insurance to cover the premises and Mr. Shafizadeh,
express a clear and unequivocal intent on the part of the Bonnemas sufficient to bar any
claim that they brought against Mr. Shafizadeh. Therefore, the Court should affirm the
decision of the trial court, remand the case solely for a determination of reasonable
attorney's fees in favor of Mr. Shafizadeh, and award Mr. Shafizadeh his costs on appeal.
DATED this
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day of May, 2004.
STRONG & HANNI
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Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
Masoud Shafizadeh
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COMMERCIAL LEASE AC-KEEZvJXNT
1.
PARTIES. This Eental Agreement ("Agreement") is dared February 25. 2000
and entered inio by and between Masoud Shafeadeh. OXes-sor*) and Steve and Tori
Boimema (^'Lessee").

A
§fy
£§
^

2.
.PREMISES Subject to the terms, covenants and conditions hereinafter set
forth, Lessor "hereby leases to Lessee, and Lessee hereby leases from Lessor,-that
certa [1
^ °ffice space rffi^'g*ftg p^ approximately 1.820 square feet in area located ax
8029 South State'. s 5 ^ t T J t S T 8 4 0 9 3 (hereinafter the "premises"), ^Hch premises aie
situated in that certain building- ("the Building.
3.
XSEM* This Agreement shall be for thirty six months coinjoiendng on the 1st
day of March, 2000 and terminating on the 28H day of February, 2003.

\A^

4.

'/#

JffiNT Lessee agrees to pay :o Lessor, as rental for the premises, the sum of
S 1400.00 (fourteen hundred dollars) per month, ia advance, on the first day of
^ f e a c h 'mDTTlJroegnnmg on the 3gc day of March 2000. If any amount due under
^^^ this lease is not received by Lessor on the 5th day of any month Lessee shall pay
ta the Lessor a late fee equal to 10% of the rent due and a charge of $10.00 a day
for every day late after the 5th of the month, Rent is ta increase 5% per year.

3.
SECUIfflT DEPOSIT- SI,400 as security deposit for the performance oi its
obligations.. In the event of a default by Lessee, Lessor may. at its option, apply such
part of the deposit as may necessary to cure the default. If Lessor does so, Lessee shall
re-deposit with Lessox the amount so applied so that Lessee will have the full security
deposit on hand during the term hereof. Upon the termination of this Lease, Lessor
shall return the then remaining balance of the deposit if Lessee has fulfilled its
obligations hereunder.

r
^J*

6.
USE. The premises shall be occupied and used exclusively for Hair/Nail Salon.
,
and for no other purposes without the written consent of Lessor. Lessee shall not da or ^ k
permit anything: to be done in or about the premises, nor bring or Iceep anything - ^
therein, which -will in any way increase the existing rate oi or affect any fire or other ^
insurance upon the building or any of its content, or cause a cancellation of any^. ^
c
insurance policy covering said building- or any part thereof or any of its contents.
Lessee shall not do or permit anything to be done in or about the premises which mil in
any way obstruct or interfere with che rights of other tenants or occupants of the
building, or injure or annoy them, or use or allow the premises to be used for any
improper, immoral, unlawful or objectionable purpose, nor shall Lessee cause, maintain
or permix any nuisance in, or~about the premises. Lessee shall not commit ox.suffer to
be committed, any waste in or upon the premise.
Lessor reserves the right to the use of BR exterior walls, windows and the roof of the
premises, and Lessee shaL not paint, hang- or affix any signs, advertisements or other
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19. DEFAULT The occurrence of any of the following; acts or omissions during- the
term oi this Lease shall constitute a default hereunder:
(a)
The failure of Lessee to make any p ayments of rent when due or to make
any other payments specified herein, if such failure is not corrected within 10 days
arter written notice thereof is given by Lessor;
_ (b) The failure of Lessee to observe and perform any other terms, covenant or
condition sf nhis^ease to be performed by Lessee when such failure is nor corrected
within 30 days after written notice diereof is grveu lv Lessor, provided, however, that if
such faimre cannot be corrected with reasonable dili-ence within 30 davs after notice
thereof, ^essor shall not be entitled to enforce the Lessor's remedies hersunde- if Lessee
commences the corrections of said failure within 30 davs period and thereafter
diligently prosecutes the same to completion;
(c) The filing; of a pennon in bankruptcy by or against Lessee, che adjudication
at lessee as bankrupt or insolvent by any court, the appointment of a trustee or
receiver for all or substantially all of Lessee's assets ox business, the maldng- by Lessee
of an assignment for the benefit of creditors, or the attachment or execution of Lessee's
leasehold interest therein:
Cd) The abandonment or vacating- of the premises by Lessee.
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shall have the following right* in addition to any ocher remedies available co Lessor at
Law or in equity:
(a) Lessor shall have the option to immediately terminate both this Lease and
Leasee's rights to possession cfthe premises by giving ^rattan norice of such intention
to Leasee and thereupon. Lessee shall immediately and peacefully surrender possession
of the premises to lessor and if lessee shall fail to surrender possession, Lessor may reenter and repossess the premises and remove alipersona and property therefrom, such
property to be stored in a public warehouse or elsewhere at the expense of Lessee. If
this Lease is so tenninated. Lessor shall be entitled to recover from lessee all rent and
other sums due hereunder from lessee which may be unpaid on the date of the Lease
termination, together "with interest thereon ar the rate of 10% per annum, pius all rent
and other sums "which ^rould have accrued and are unpaid hereunder, commencing
from the date of the Lease termination and continuing for the balance of the term of
this Lease, less the amount if any, which Lasses yiwes could be mitigated.
(b) Lessor shall have the option to re-enter and repossess the premises, 'without
terminating' this Lease, and to remove all persons and property therefrom, such
property to be stored, hi a public warehouse or ebewnere at the expense of Lessee. If
this Lease is not terminated. Lessor may from time w time recover all rent and other
payments as they become due or may re-let the premises or any part thereon upon such
terms and conditions as Lessor may deem advisable, and such re-letting shall not
constitute a termination of this Lease. Rentals received by Lessor from any such reletting shall be applied first to the cost of re-letting next to the payment of the cost of
any necessary repairs or alterations and then to the payment of rent or other charges
due hereunder. The residue, if any, shall be held by Lessor and applied to future rent
payments as they became due. Any deficiencies between the rent received from the reletting" and the rent and other amounts due from lessee hereunder, shall be paid to
lessor by Lessee immediately upon Lessor's demand.
21 HOLDOVER TENANCY. If Lessee holds possession of the premises after the
expiration of the term of this Lease, Lessee shall become a tenant from month to month
upon the terms, covenants and conditions herein specified and at a monthly rental
equivalent to the rent paid oy Lessee at the expiration of the term of the Lease
pursuant to Paragraph 5, plus a 10% increase- Such tenancy shall continue until
terminated by Lessor, or until Lessee shall have given Lessor at least one months prior
written notice of intention to terminate such tenancy.
22.
ATTORNEYS FEES If Lessor cr Lessee shall bring any action for any relief.
against the other arising out of this Agreement, or to recover possession of said
property whether such action progresses to judgment or not the losing part}* shall pay
to the successful party, in addition to any other relief granted, its cost and expenses
including reasonable attorney's fees.
23.
NQN-.WAIYER. Nothing contained in this Agreement shall be construed aa
waiving any of Lessor's rights under the laws of the State of Utah.
24.
NOTTCBS. Any norice required or permitted to be given under this Agreement
shall b e in writing and may be given by p ersonal delivery or sent postagB prepaid by
registered or certified mail addressed ro Lessee at the premises and the Lesser at 1620
East Langdale Circle. Sandy. Utah. 54093 or to such other person or place as either
parry hereto may from time :c m ? nouiy the other party in a norice.
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domain, in whole or substantially in parr, fox public purposes, then this Rental
Agreement, at the option of the Lessor, shall forthwith cease and terminate, and the
current rent shall be properly apportioned to the date of such taking and in any such
event Lessor shall receive the entire award for the lands and improvements 30 taken,
and Lessee shall make no claim against Lessor for compensation in connection with the
taking referred to above.
26.
SUBORDINATION, This Rental Agreement and all of the rights of tenant
hereunder are and shall be subject and Subordinate to the lien of any mortgage or deed
of trust now or hereafter placed on the demised premises, and 10 any and all renewals,
modifications, consolidaaons, replacements, extensions or substitutions thereof.

27
AMENDMENT. ADDENDUM MODIFICATION,
Any Amendments,
Addendum, Modifications- and/or other Supplements, if any be hereto attached, are
made a pare hereof, and shall be binding: upon the parties hereto, and of any provision
of said Amendments. Addendum, Modifications, ar Supplements shall conflict in any
manner with any other provision of this Eental Agreement, the provision of
Amendment, Addendum, Modification or Supplement shall prevail.
28. Substitute Premises. This section was purposely deleted,
29.
ENTITLED LIABILITY OF LESSOR. Lessor shall not be personally or
individually liable or obligated under this rental agreement to Lessee, or for any such
action or inaction on part of Lessor. Rather, any and all such liability and obligations
of Lessor shall be limited to and paid solely from said office building property and the
rents, issues, and profits therefrom.
30. TIME OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence of &d* lease. IN WITNESS
WHEREOF. Lessor and Lessee have executed this lease.
31. Tenant Improvements.
Landlord to provide space in "AS IS" condition
Tenant to be responsible fox their own improvements.
32, Signals. Tenant to be allowed signage on t i e front of the building at tenants
expense, with Landlord approval,.
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